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Abstract. Side-channel attacks against implementations of elliptic-curve
cryptography have been extensively studied in the literature and a large
tool-set of countermeasures is available to thwart different attacks in
different contexts. The current state of the art in attacks and counter-
measures is nicely summarized in multiple survey papers, the most recent
one by Danger et al [21]. However, any combination of those countermea-
sures is ineffective against attacks that require only a single trace and
directly target a conditional move (cmov) – an operation that is at the
very foundation of all scalar-multiplication algorithms. This operation
can either be implemented through arithmetic operations on registers or
through various different approaches that all boil down to loading from
or storing to a secret address. In this paper we demonstrate that such
an attack is indeed possible for ECC software running on AVR ATmega
microcontrollers, using a protected version of the popular µNaCl library
as an example. For the targeted implementations, we are able to recover
99.6% of the key bits for the arithmetic approach and 95.3% of the key
bits for the approach based on secret addresses, with confidence levels
76.1% and 78.8%, respectively. All publicly available ECC software for
the AVR that we are aware of uses one of the two approaches and is thus
in principle vulnerable to our attack.
Keywords: ECC, Montgomery ladder, power analysis, AVR,
conditional move.
1 Introduction
For many years, efficient software implementations of cryptographic algorithms
for constrained embedded processors were mainly restricted to symmetric ci-
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phers. However, in recent years, various libraries for elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) have been published that offer acceptable runtime and code size also on
microcontrollers with limited computational resources, e.g., the 8-bit AVR AT-
mega series of processor. Notable examples for these ECC implementations are
summarized in Table 1.
Name Description SCA countermeasures
micro-ecc [44] 8/32/64-bit C impl. for NIST
curves
not documented; apparently
randomized projective coordi-
nates
nano-ecc [34] Derivate of micro-ecc same as micro-ecc
µNaCl [33,24,49] Curve25519 for 8/16/32-bit
processors
constant-time
AVR-Crypto-Lib [53] ECDSA with NIST P-192 none
FLECC_IN_C [59] 8/16/32/64-bit C impl. for
various curves
constant time, randomized
projective coordinates
RELIC [2] Various curves and fields sup-
ported
constant-time
WM-ECC [58] Impl. for sensor networks none
TinyECC [43] Impl. for sensor networks none
MIRACL [13] Lib. supporting multiple
curves
none
WolfSSL [60] Support for AVR unclear none
Wiselib [1] Lib. for distributed systems none
CRS ECC [56] Commercial, closed source none
Table 1: Overview of ECC implementations for embedded processors.
Due to the fact that an adversary often has physical access to an embedded
device performing ECC operations, implementation attacks and in particular
side-channel analysis (SCA) are severe threats in this scenario. Consequently,
several libraries comprise countermeasures against SCA, for example, by per-
forming computations in constant-time, or by using randomized projective co-
ordinates. The protected implementations are further detailed in Table 1.
Many common SCA countermeasures assume that the adversary needs access
to multiple traces (with identical scalar) to recover the secret key, which inher-
ently protects protocols with ephemeral scalars. In this paper, we challenge this
assumption and target fundamental building blocks of any ECC implementation,
namely conditional moves and loads/stores from/to secret memory addresses.
We show that template attacks allow to recover most of the secret scalar with a
single trace of elliptic-curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) in both cases, which
in turn renders all currently published ECC implementations for the AVR (and
likely other, similar architectures) insecure.
Note that although this paper focuses on implementations of ECC, our at-
tacks also apply to exponentiation algorithms as used in, e.g., RSA, classical
Diffie-Hellman, DSA, or ElGamal. We actually expect the attacks to work even
better there, because group elements are larger and thus require more loads (or
conditional moves). We leave this investigation for future work.
Related work. Carefully combining countermeasures like uniformity of mod-
ular operations, (re-)randomization of the projective representation of points,
scalar blinding, point blinding, and random field (or curve) isomorphisms pre-
vent classical side-channel attacks like timing [40], SPA [20], DPA [41], CPA [11]
or collision attacks [26,32]. These attacks require a fixed scalar for multiple mea-
sured power or electromagnetic traces. The main protection relies on the full ran-
domization of intermediate data, including input point, scalar and group, during
the execution of an ECSM [19,4,25]. In this work we consider implementations
based on the Montgomery ladder algorithm, protected by scalar randomization
(SR) and projective-coordinate randomization5.
To overcome the aforementioned countermeasures two kinds of attacks have
emerged: template and horizontal attacks. Although in general template at-
tacks [14] can be used to attack multiple traces that share the same scalar,
we need to attack ECSM traces independently, because of the SR. Template at-
tacks combine statistical modeling and power-analysis, and consist of two phases.
In the first phase, called profiling, the attacker builds templates by executing a
sequence of instructions using a fixed scalar (with SR turned off). The second
phase is called matching, in which the attacker matches the templates to at-
tacked single traces (with SR turned on). The assumption is that the attacker
possesses a profiling device, in order to build templates, that behaves the same
as the target device, and runs the same implementation.
Template attacks on ECC trace back to an attack on ECDSA demonstrated
by Medwed and Oswald [45]. However, this attack requires an oﬄine DPA on the
ECSM during profiling, in order to select the points of interest. Moreover, since
the attack exploits data-dependent leakage it requires profiling with multiple
templates (i.e., 33) while for our attacks two templates are enough. Furthermore,
the attack only needs to recover a few bits of the multiple ephemeral scalars and
can then employ ECDSA-specific lattice techniques to recover the long-term
secret key [10]. This is not possible in the context of our work, since we do not
target ECDSA: an attacker has only a single trace to recover sufficiently many
bits of the randomized scalar using SCA to be able to compute the remaining
bits.
Another template attack on ECC is presented in [31]. This attack follows
a similar approach to our attack, but instead of exploiting address-dependent
leakage, it exploits register location based leakage using a high-resolution in-
ductive EM probe. As a result the attack is considerably expensive to execute.
A template attack on a wNAF ECC algorithm is presented in [61]. However,
this attack is applied to an implementation that is not protected with either,
5 The implementations actually attacked apply only projective coordinates randomiza-
tion, however, our attack also works on an implementation with SR enabled, because
we do not make any assumption about the secret scalar, i.e., it may be different from
one execution to another.
scalar randomization or base-point randomization. Another approach to attack
ECC are the so called online template attacks [5,23]. These attacks work if SR
is enabled, but not when point randomization is enabled.
The template attack from [16] targets load instructions. However, multiple
traces are required in the attack phase. Therefore, this attack does not work
against implementations protected by SR. The template attack from [29] aims
to extract a random multiplicative mask (base-blinding) out of a single mea-
surement exploiting data leakage; then it is possible to unmask all intermediate
values and run DPA.
Horizontal attacks on RSA [57,18,17,8,6,30,55,15,9,54] and ECC [7,28] are
emerging forms of side-channel attacks on exponentiation-based or scalar-mul-
tiplication-based algorithms. Their methodology allows recovering the exponent
bits through the analysis of individual traces. Therefore, these attacks are ef-
ficient against SR even when combined with point and group randomization.
The attacks employ different common distinguishers: SPA, horizontal correlation
analysis [18], Euclidean distance [57], horizontal collision-correlation [17,8,6,7],
horizontal cross-correlation [28], or clustering [30,55].
An interesting horizontal address-based DPA attack on Montgomery multi-
plications is presented in [15]. The approach is similar to ours, but this attack
exploits Hamming weight leakage of addresses. Furthermore, the analysis in [15]
lacks the results for a full modular exponentiation (only a few iterations are
attacked) and success rates.
The main issue of horizontal attacks is that extracting leakage from a single
unlabeled trace is usually heavily limited by noise. Therefore, we have decided
to attack our state-of-the art implementations, that contains scalar and point
randomizations, using a more powerful attack paradigm, from the point of view
of the attacker setting, namely, template attacks.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
1. First, by the example of a protected version of µNaCl, we show that the
single-trace leakage of conditional moves within the Montgomery ladder can
be exploited to recover the scalar.
2. Second, we show that a similar attack applies to loads and stores from/to
secret-dependent addresses. In doing so, we show that even implementations
on embedded devices without cache cannot tolerate secret-dependent mem-
ory accesses.
3. Finally, we generalize the method from [27] to tolerate a certain number of
incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on normal or side-channel-
enhanced exhaustive search. Furthermore, we present experimental results
for our algorithm.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: in Section 2, we review the use of conditional moves in scalar multipli-
cation algorithms, together with possible countermeasures against side-channel
analysis. Then, in Section 3, we describe the measurement setup and target
implementation used for our attacks presented subsequently: while Section 4
deals with template attacks on the (arithmetic) conditional swap within the
Montgomery ladder, Section 5 applies similar methods to recover the scalar by
exploiting the leakage of secret load addresses. Section 6 discusses how to toler-
ate a certain number of incorrectly recovered scalar bits more efficiently than by
simple exhaustive search. Finally, we conclude in Section 7 with directions for
future work, in particular regarding countermeasures.
2 Scalar multiplication and conditional moves
The most basic scalar-multiplication algorithm is the double-and-add algorithm,
which scans through the bits of the scalar and performs a double operation for
each zero bit and a double-and-add operation for each one bit. This algorithm is
well known to be vulnerable to all kind of side-channel attacks, including power
analysis and timing attacks.
The first step to side-channel protection is to always perform the same se-
quence of finite-field operations, independent of the scalar. The most common
approaches to achieve such a structure are either to use (fixed-window) double-
and-add-always scalar multiplication or ladder-based approaches (typically the
Montgomery ladder [46] or, for general Weierstrass curves, the Brier-Joye lad-
der [12]). Another layer of side-channel protection then adds randomization of
the scalar (through one of various blinding methods), and the internal repre-
sentation of points (for example through projective randomization, field isomor-
phisms, or curve isomorphisms). By re-randomizing before or after each ECSM
loop iteration, most horizontal collision or cross-correlation attacks are thwarted.
Interestingly, even with all those countermeasures in place, scalar-multiplica-
tion algorithms contain operations that choose one out of two (or more) curve
points depending on bit(s) of the scalar. An attacker who learns all of these
choices from side-channel information from just one trace, learns all of the scalar
bits used in this scalar multiplication and thus obtains the secret key. On micro-
controllers with restricted register space, there are essentially two different ways
to implement this conditional move (cmov): either by loading from (or storing
to) addresses that depend on the secret scalar, or by using arithmetic opera-
tions to perform a conditional register-to-register move. The latter approach is
very common on large processors with cache, where the former approach leaks
through cache-timing information. Essentially, the idea is to replace a compu-
tation of the form R ← P [s], where s is a secret scalar bit, by a computation
of the form R ← sP [1] + (1 − s)P [0]. Note that this approach does not require
actual multiplications; it is much easier to expand s to a bit mask of all ones or
all zeros and use bit-logical instructions.
Most implementations of ECSM contain considerably more than just one
secretly-indexed load, store, or conditional move. Sometimes this is a choice made
by the implementors to improve performance (by avoiding otherwise unnecessary
loads and stores); sometimes it is an inherent property of the ECSM algorithm.
For example, the Montgomery ladder needs a conditional swap (cswap) of two
points instead of a conditional move, which requires significantly more operations
that involve the secret scalar bit than a simple cmov (for details, see Section 4).
The side-channel attacks described in the remainder of this paper attack
both implementations that make use of secretly indexed memory accesses (in
Section 5) and implementations that use the arithmetic cmov operation (or more
specifically, the cswap operation) in Section 4. The idea of attacking loads from
secret positions through side-channel information is not new: it is not only used
in various cache-timing attacks (that do not apply to simple architectures such as
the AVR), but it is also the underlying principle of address-bit-DPA [35]. What
is novel is the fact that we need only a single trace. This renders countermeasures
such as scalar blinding and address randomization [36,38] ineffective.
3 Attack setup
In this section, we describe the targeted implementations, the utilized micro-
controller, our measurement setup. The trace pre-processing, frequency filtering
and alignement, are described in Appendix B.
3.1 Target implementations
We target two protected ECSM implementations based on [49]. Both employ the
Montgomery ladder, with the pseudocode given in Algorithm 1. The main dif-
ference between the two variants is the realization of the cmov (i.e., the function
cswap_coords): The first implementation, described in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.1, consists of applying an arithmetic conditional swap of the respective
coordinates values of the working points P1 = (X1 : Z1) and P2 = (X2 : Z2).
The second, described in Section 5.1, replaces the arithmetic conditional swap by
a conditional swap of pointers to the coordinate values. Both implementations
utilize projective-coordinate re-randomization as the main side-channel counter-
measure. A randomly generated λ ∈ Fp is multiplied with the coordinates of
P1 = (X1 : Z1) and P2 = (X2 : Z2) at the beginning of every ECSM iteration.
We make publicly available the source code for both implementations [48].
3.2 Target device and measurement setup
We carried out our experiments with an ATmega328P 8-bit microcontroller
placed on the target board of the ChipWhisperer [51] side-channel evaluation
platform. While the ChipWhisperer also provides the possibility to capture ana-
log signals (e.g., power consumption or electro-magnetic emanation), we used a
separate oscilloscope (Picoscope 5203) due to the limited bandwidth, memory,
and sample rate of the ChipWhisperer.
The targeted ATmega328P has a 32KB of Flash, 2KB of SRAM, and 1KB
of EEPROM. The register file contains 32 registers (R0–R31), among which 6
serve as pointers for indirect 16-bit addressing and have the following aliases: X
(R27:R26), Y (R29:R28) and Z (R31:R30). Arithmetic instructions take 1 cycle,
Algorithm 1 Montgomery ladder with arithmetic cswap and randomized pro-
jective coordinates.
// ... initialization omitted ..
bprev ← 0
for i = 254 . . . 0 do
re_randomize_coords(work)
b← bit i of scalar
s← b⊕ bprev
bprev ← b
cswap_coords(work, s)
ladderstep(work)
end for
with the exception of multiplication instructions, which take 2 cycles. Loads
and stores from/to SRAM take 2 cycles. Loads from Flash take 3 cycles. More
technical details about the target device are given in Appendix A.
4 Attacking arithmetic cswaps
In this section, we describe a template attack on conditional swaps (cswaps)
in the Montgomery ladder step. In our case, the cswap is implemented using
Boolean and arithmetic operations in constant time.
4.1 Target implementation
In the Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 1), the function cswap_coords imple-
ments the cswap (based on input bit s) by first creating a maskm, which is either
0x00 or 0xFF for s = 0 and s = 1, respectively, by setting m = −s (assuming
m, s are 8-bit values). Then, a (conditional) XOR swap is executed as follows:
Listing 1.1: Conditional XOR swap.
1 ld xx , X ; X register points to first value
2 ld yy , Z ; Z register points to second value
3 mov tt , xx
4 eor tt , yy
5 and tt , m ; tt = (xx XOR yy) AND m
6 eor xx , tt ; xx = xx XOR tt
7 eor yy , tt ; yy = yy XOR tt
8 st X+, xx ; Store first value
9 st Z+, yy ; Store second value
In other words, if m = 0x00 (s = 0), tt = 0 and the XORs xx = xx ⊕ tt and
yy = yy ⊕ tt leave the values unchanged. Otherwise, if m = 0xFF (s = 1), we
have a standard XOR swap, i.e., xx = xx ⊕ xx ⊕ yy = yy (equivalent for yy).
4.2 Template generation and matching
We generated templates for the and instruction (line 5 of Listing 1.1), grouping
the traces in the profiling set into two sets V0 and V1. Traces in V0 represent
those wherem = 0 (i.e., an AND with 0x00), while V1 are traces wherem = 0xFF.
Note that the traces were cut to only contain the clock cycle for the targeted
and instruction, i.e., each trace is 64 · 67 = 4288 samples long (cf. Appendix B).
For Vi, i = 0, 1, we subsequently computed templates consisting of the point-
wise mean vector µ(i) and the covariance matrix Σ(i) [14]. Note that the two
possible leakages 0x00 (all bits zero) and 0xFF (all bits one) can be expected
to be maximally (or at least to a large degree) different, which should facilitate
template attacks in this particular case.
We matched the templates to the traces in the test set with the standard ap-
proach, i.e., computing the respective probabilities using the multivariate normal
distribution pdf and identifying the template with the highest probability to re-
cover the respective bit of the scalar. The respective success rates wrt the size
of the profiling set are given in Section 4.3.
Classification. For each template we computed the Euclidean distance between
the sample vector and the template mean vector. The template (T0 or T1) that
results in the smallest distance is considered the best match for the sample
vector. In this attack, the index of the closest template (0 or 1) corresponds to
the swap bit.
Confidence score and confidence level. For the first classification method
we derived a simple confidence score on the recovered bit value based on the
distances (d0 and d1) to each template. It varies linearly for a particular d0+ d1
value, ranging from 0 (no confidence) and 1 (full confidence):
conf_score = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣0.5− min(d0, d1)d0 + d1
∣∣∣∣ (1)
We furthermore define the confidence level of a given trace (in the test set)
as follows: Let us call a recovered bit suspicious if its confidence level is less than
the greatest confidence score of any falsely identified bit (whereas this threshold
is determined experimentally in the profiling phase). Then, the confidence level
is the percentage of bits that are not suspicious, i.e., that can be unambiguously
recovered. Note that the average confidence level (over all number of traces in
the test set) is always less than or equal to the average success rate, since an
incorrectly recovered bit is always suspicious.
4.3 Attack results
Figure 1 shows the average and best case success rates (computed over all
255 scalar bits), together with the respective confidence levels over the num-
ber of traces used for template generation and matching. Note that each full
trace comprises 255 ECSM iterations, which were all used for generating the
templates – in other words, each full trace contributes 255 “effective” traces to
the profiling set.
The traces used for template generation and matching were taken from dif-
ferent trace sets (coming from different capture sessions). The same number of
traces was used for profiling and testing, i.e., a given value on the horizontal axis
of Figure 1 is the same for profiling and testing.
10
 (2550)
20
 (5100)
40
 (10200)
60
 (15300)
100
 (25500)
Number of full (effective) traces
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
(%
)
Success Rate (avg.)
Success Rate (best)
Confidence Level (avg.)
Confidence Level (best)
Fig. 1: Success rates for the template at-
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Fig. 2: Results for the template attack on
loads/stores for different number of full
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As evident in Figure 1, already for 10 full traces (i.e., about 2,550 effective
traces), the average success rate reaches 96.71%, i.e., we can recover most of
the bits of the scalar. Furthermore, the best success rate reaches 99.6% with the
confidence level 76.1%. By increasing the number of traces, both success rate and
confidence level change only minimally; due to the strong leakage of the targeted
device, most information can be already extracted with a low trace count.
5 Attacking secret-dependent memory accesses
In general, ECC (and in particular NaCl-derived) implementations avoid loads
from secret-dependent addresses altogether due to the possibility of cache-timing
attacks. However, for embedded implementations without caches, secret load ad-
dresses are sometimes deemed acceptable. In this section, we show that template
attacks can be employed to exploit this leakage.
5.1 Target implementation
The targeted implementation replaces the cswap of the (X1 : Z1) and (X2 : Z2)
coordinates values used in the targeted implementation in Algorithm 1 by work-
ing with pointers to those coordinates, and conditionally swapping these point-
ers. Besides being slightly faster, this implementation also potentially exhibits
less leakage, because it uses the secret-dependent mask m in an AND operation
only twice for each pointer cswap6, rather than 32 times as in the ECSM imple-
mentation based on arithmetic cswap (cf. Section 4.1).
However, in implementations of finite-field operations both input and output
operands are pointers. The values of these pointers are addresses to the memory
holding the actual field element value, and those addresses directly depend on
whether the swap occurred or not, which in turn depends on the value of the
secret mask bit.
AVR memory access instructions internals. Memory access instructions
(loads and stores) on an AVR take 2 clock cycles to execute. According to the
ATmega328 datasheet [3], the effective address for such instructions is computed
in the first cycle, while during the second cycle, the data word is read (load) or
written (store) if the effective address is valid. Our proposed attack focuses on the
address leakage of memory access instructions, and thus any data-dependency
may negatively impact the attack success rate if not detected and mitigated.
Therefore, we take advantage of this architectural feature by using only the
samples from the first clock period of such instructions.
Targeted loads and stores. During each iteration of the Montgomery lad-
der, the actual field arithmetic occurs in the so-called ladderstep function
(cf. Algorithm 1). We target the loads and stores addresses in the first three
field operations in ladderstep, i.e., addition, subtraction, and addition. Each
of these operations has two Fp inputs (a and b) and one output r.
Finite-field addition and subtraction are implemented with reduction modulo
2256−38. The reduction step also execute loads and stores, of which the samples
are also used for template creation and matching. Listing 1.2 shows a small
segment of the execution trace containing the loads of the first operands bytes
and the store of the first byte of the result (before reduction):
Listing 1.2: Segment of the execution trace for a field addition.
1 0x171a: fp_add +0x5 LD R20 , X+ ; first byte of a
2 0x171a: fp_add +0x5 CPU -waitstate
3 0x171c: fp_add +0x6 LD R21 , Y+ ; first byte of b
4 0x171c: fp_add +0x6 CPU -waitstate
5 0x171e: fp_add +0x7 ADD R20 , R21
6 0x1720: fp_add +0x8 ST Z+, R20 ; first byte of r
7 0x1720: fp_add +0x8 CPU -waitstate
Our oscilloscope’s memory is divided into 255 segments, each of which is
65 kSample in length. A memory segment holds the samples captured from a
single ECSM iteration. Due to the 65 kSample limit for each ECSM iteration, we
were able to capture the samples from all the loads and stores from the first field
addition and the first field subtraction, but only half of the loads and stores from
the arithmetic part of the second field addition. Note that the memory limitation
6 For the AVR architecture, pointers are 16 bit wide and one AND with the secret-
dependent bit is required to cswap a byte. Thus a pointer cswap requires two ANDs.
is due to the relatively low-cost oscilloscope we used—high-end equipment would
further facilitate the presented attack.
Table 2 shows the number of executed instructions of each type that are used
in the attack. We used a total of 372 instructions, which are concatenated into a
single sample vector. After trace preprocessing, 67 power samples are available
per clock cycle, and as only the first clock period of a memory access instruction
is used, the sample vector per ECSM iteration has nv = 24, 924 samples.
Table 2: Number of executed instructions of each type that are used in the attack.
Type 1st fp_add fp_sub 2nd fp_add Total
LD R20, X+ 32 32 16 80
LD R21, Y+ 32 32 16 80
LD R20, Z+0 33 33 0 66
ST Z+, R20 65 65 16 146
5.2 Template generation
Each load or store instruction accesses at most two possible addresses. If it
always accesses the same address, then it does not provide useful leakage relevant
for the attack. Considering only those loads and stores that may access two
addresses, during any execution of the ladderstep, only two distinct sequences
of addresses can be accessed: Anoswap, containing the addresses accessed before
the first pointers swap has taken place7, i.e., an even state (noswap state); and
Aswap containing the addresses accessed in an odd state (swap state).
First, we grouped the sample vectors into two sets. The first set, V0, consists
of the load/store sample vectors for addresses in the set Anoswap, while the
second set, V1, contains those originating from addresses in set Aswap. Then,
we computed various statistics for each sample index of Vi, i = 0, 1: mean µ(i),
standard deviation σ(i), median md(i), as well as lower l(i) and upper u(i)
percentiles (the actual percentiles used are discussed in 5.3). The collection of
these statistics for V0 and V1, called T0 and T1, are the two possible templates.
5.3 Point-of-interest selection
The POI selection consists of using the lower and upper percentile vectors l(i)
and u(i) (i=0,1) to compute the intersection of the pair of intervals [l(0)j , u
(0)
j ]
and [l(1)j , u
(1)
j ] for each sample index j = 1, . . . , nv. The sample indices where the
intersection is empty are the considered POIs.
7 These addresses are the same as those accessed after the 2nd but before the 3rd swap,
or after the 4th but before the 5th swap, and so on.
Intuitively, the sample indices with an empty intersection are those that are
good distinguishers for the two templates, because in these points the samples
tend to be clustered around the median (and also typically around the mean) of
one template, rather than being scattered.
Different values for the lower and upper percentiles may give a different
number of POIs, and that directly affects the success rate and confidence level
of the attack. Thus, we tested the attack for different pairs of values for these
parameters, ranging from wider and more selective percentiles (12.5, 87.5)8 to
narrow, less selective (40, 60).We emphasize that the POI selection is completely
based on the samples of the traces used for the generation—it does not depend
on the samples of the trace being attacked (i.e., the sample vector to classify).
In fact, the POIs are represented as a Boolean vector used during template
matching to select the samples from the target trace vector to be classified.
POI selection refinements. To improve the confidence level of the attack, we
tested two POI selection refinements, as explained above. First, we noticed that
when using more selective percentile parameters, the current selection method
returned sample indices that were clustered in a few instructions, while most of
the remaining instructions were not covered by any sample, although they should
in theory contribute some leakage. To make the POIs more evenly distributed
and exploit leakage from all useful instructions, we forced a minimum of one
sample index per instruction to be included in the POI vector. If there was no
sample index for a given instruction in the current POI vector, one was randomly
selected. Second, also due to the clustering of the POIs in a few instructions,
we limit the number of samples per instruction to one. In the case that sample
indices had to be removed, we selected those randomly as well.
5.4 Template matching
At first, without using any POI selection, we tried to use the standard multivari-
ate Gaussian model, taking advantage of both the mean vector and covariance
matrix computed from V0 and V1 (also known as complete templates) similar to
the approach of Section 4. However, in contrast to Section 4, the sample vec-
tors to be classified and the mean template vectors are relatively long (24, 924
samples) and relatively similar to each other (i.e., their Euclidean distance is
very small), numerical instability issues due to almost singular matrices arose
during the computation of the probability density function. For those reasons,
we decided to use reduced templates instead, which uses only the mean vectors.
After applying POI selection, the matched sample vectors are much smaller,
and thus full templates could then in principle be applied, as the covariance
matrices would not lead to numerical instability. However, due to the high success
rates achieved using the reduced templates, we decided to not use full templates
to avoid increasing storage and computational requirements.
We also evaluated the effect on the attack success rate and confidence level
of compressing the sample vector using normal and absolute sum for different
8 I.e., the lower is the 12.5-percentile and the upper is the 87.5-percentile.
window lengths. In addition, we applied a straightforward outlier detection to
remove samples that have likely been subject to larger distortions: In the match-
ing phase, we discarded all samples that have a distance of more than a multiple
of standard deviations to the mean trace at the respective point in time. Using
reduced templates, template matching boils down to computing the (squared)
Euclidean distance between the sample vector to match and the template mean
vectors. The lower that distance is, the stronger is the match. In this case, other
distinguishers can be used in a straightforward way, and thus we also tested the
attack using the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Classification methods and confidence score.As a first classification method
to test, we selected the template closer to the sample vector (cf. Section 4.2). We
also tested majority voting classification, where each sample is individually clas-
sified, also based on its distance to the corresponding element in the templates
mean vectors, and the majority vote wins. In both cases, as each template di-
rectly corresponds to a scalar bit value, the classification output is the recovered
bit value. The confidence score was computed in the same way as in Section 4.2.
5.5 Attack results
Figure 2 depicts average and best case success rates for the template attack
on secret-dependent memory accesses for the best and average cases. Again, as
in Section 4.3, the trace sets used for template generation and matching were
recorded in different capture sessions, and the same number of traces was used
for each set. Again, only a limited number of profiling traces was sufficient to
reach success rates exceeding 90%; the best success rate reaches 95.3% (there
are only 12 errors) with the confidence level 78.8% (the 12 errors are included in
the 54 suspicious bits). To investigate the effect of various pre-processing steps
and attack parameters, using 10 traces we investigated the average success rate
and confidence level depending on various attack parameters. In particular, we
investigated various signal frequency filtering options, POI selection methods,
classification and compression methods, outlier filtering, and distinguishers; the
result of the investigation are described in Appendix B. The best parameters that
we discovered, were used to perform the main attack described in this section.
6 Error detection and correction
Due to noise, data leakage (note that we are aiming at exploiting the address
leakage only), and other aspects that interfere with the side-channel analysis
(misalignment, clock jitter, etc), the derivation of the final scalar for a single
trace likely contains errors. If the amount of wrong bits is sufficiently small,
then a brute-force attack may still be feasible. However, first the attacker needs
a metric to indicate the location of the possible wrong bits in the recovered
scalar. The notion of suspicious bits (cf. Section 4.2) can be used as a reference
for the scalar bits selection with respect to a brute-force attack.
Let us consider the trace with smallest amount of suspicious bits from the ex-
periment from Section 5; for this trace there are 54 suspicious bits that comprise
all falsely identified bits. Unfortunately, to recover a full randomized scalar, even
in this case, the attacker needs O(254) operations, which is generally impractical.
Note, that we consider only the worst-case complexity and not the average case.
To improve the brute-force complexity, there are two options. The first ap-
proach is to try to exploit the distribution of suspicious bits for incorrectly (red)
and correctly (blue) recovered bits (Figure 3). While there is a clear trend for
incorrect bits to have lower confidence score, the intersection between correct
and incorrect bits is large. Still, it may possible to exploit the trend with an in-
formed brute force attack [42], prioritizing bits with the lowest confidence score.
Unfortunately this attack works well if the bits containing errors are adjacent
and that is not the case in our setting.
Fig. 3: Distribution of confidence scores over all traces for suspicious bits. Red: incor-
rectly recovered bits, blue: correctly recovered but suspicious bits.
Alternatively (or combined with the informed brute-force search), we ap-
ply the second algorithm from [27], which is originally designed for square-and-
multiply chains, to the Montgomery ladder. We describe how the algorithm works
using the aforementioned example trace, which contains s = 54 suspicious bits,
as an example. Let us represent the indices of these bits as a list sorted in de-
scending order: is, . . . i1, where each ij ∈ {0, . . . 254} and s ≥ j ≥ 1; note that
there are 255 bits in total. Let x denote the bit index ib s2+1c (namely, i28 for the
example trace). Let a be the number represented by the bit string corresponding
to the left part of the scalar from x (including ix) and let b be the number cor-
responding to the bit string of the (least significant) right part. Furthermore, we
know that R = [k]P , where R is the resulting point, k the scalar to be recovered,
and P the input point. Then, clearly R = [k]P = [a·2ix+b]P = [a]([2ix ]P )+[b]P .
If we denote [2ix ]P by H, then the above equation reduces to
R− [b]P = [a]H (2)
We can use Equation 2 to check correctness of our guess. Now, following [27],
we use a time-memory trade-off technique to speed up an exhaustive search:
Consider all different possible guesses for a. For each guess, we compute [a]H
and store all pairs (a, [a]H). We then sort all pairs based on the value of [a]H
and store them in an ordered table.
Next, we make a guess for b and compute z = R − [b]P . If our guess for
b is correct, then z is present in the second column of some row in the table
we built—the first column is the corresponding a. Finding such a pair can be
done using binary search, as the table is sorted as per the second column. If
z is present, we are done since we have determined the scalar. Otherwise, we
make a new, different guess for b and continue. Since there are approximately
2 s2 guesses for a and b, the time complexity is O(2 s2 ) operations. As there are 2 s2
guesses for a, the table has that many entries and the space complexity is O(2 s2 )
points. This way, we limit the time complexity to O(2 s2 ) (cf. [27] for a detailed
complexity analysis), which is O(227) for the example trace.
We do not know which trace contains the smallest number of suspicious
bits since we do not know the maximum confidence score of a falsely identified
bit. However, to use the above algorithm we assume that we know the number
of suspicious bits to be bruteforced to recover the correct scalar. This can be
determined by using templates to attack some traces, for which we know the
randomized key. Furthermore, note that if the attack fails, we can extend the
execution to the second most likely suspicious bit and reuse the previously ob-
tained data. Based on our experiments, we determined that the number 54 of
suspicious bits should cover all falsely identified bits for at least one trace. Our
complete attack works as follows: in parallel, we run the above algorithm for
each of the n traces. We stop the attack as soon as the time-memory trade-off
technique succeeds for one trace.
Since we are running the attack n times in parallel the complexity of the com-
plete attack is multiplied by n. It totals to O(n · 2 s2 ) operations and O(n · 2 s2 )
points in memory. For the attack from the previous section, this corresponds
to O
(
100 · 227) = O (232) operations. Therefore, We conclude that we can effi-
ciently recover the scalar successfully even in the presence of multiple errors and
uncertain bits (for experimental results see section 6.1). Furthermore, we believe
that the above technique may be of independent interest since it can be applied
to a commonly used ECSM algorithm, i.e., Montgomery ladder, even if errors
are spread independently in the scalar.
6.1 Algorithm implementation and experimental results
The first challenge we faced is how to compute the point subtraction in Equation
2. Curve25519 is a curve in the Montgomery form, and as such, there is an
efficient formula for differential point addition using XZ coordinates, but no
efficient formula to compute a standard point addition, as far as we know. For
that reason, we decided to do the point addition in affine coordinates, which
costs a field inversion and a few multiplications. However, to use them we need
to know the y-coordinates y(R) and y([b]P ). The attack assumes that x(R) (the
ECSM output) is known, but y(R) is not, and thus has to be computed. To
do so, we use the curve formula directly to compute the two possible values for
y(R), at the cost of a field square root, an expensive operation, but it has to be
done only once for each value of R. In the case of y([b]P ), an efficient algorithm
by Okeya and Sakurai [52] costs one field inversion.
To generate the table of precomputed points A = [a]H and to compute
B = [b]P in eq. (2), the naive approach is to compute a full ECSM for each value
of a and b. A more efficient method is to apply Gray coding to the suspicious bits
in scalars a and b. One property of such a code is that consecutive code words
differ in just a single bit, which means that, in our context, we can generate
[k′]P from [k]P using a single point addition (if the bit changed from 0 to 1) or
point subtraction (if the change is from 1 to 0), where k and k′ are scalars whose
unknown bits are represented as Gray code words, and the code word in k′ is the
successor of the respective code word in k. To compute the sequence of points
[ki]P (i = 0, 1...), we first construct the scalar k0, by setting the unknown bits
to zero and the (assumed correct) recovered bits from the output of the SCA
attack to their respective values. Then, we apply the full ECSM algorithm to
compute [k0]P , and from there we use the aforementioned method to generate
the sequence of points [k1]P, [k2]P . . . , which costs essentially a point addition
per each computed point.
We implemented the key recovery algorithm with the aforementioned arithmetic-
level optimizations as a single-threaded program. We tested our implementation
in a smaller scale, to recover 40 suspicious bits of a scalar on a PC with 8GB of
RAM total, but only 5GB available for the program, a i7-3740QM CPU, run-
ning at 2.7GHz. It took 1h23 to recover the correct scalar, where about 1.5ms is
spent to add a single entry to the table and about 3ms to test a possible value
of b. By using these time values as a reference, we estimate that the time for the
recovery of a scalar with 60 suspicious bits using the current implementation is
around 18 days. The source code of the key recovery implementation is publicly
available [47].
7 Conclusions and Possible Countermeasures
In this paper we show that the single-trace leakage of conditional moves can
be exploited to recover the scalar using a template attack. We also show that
a similar attack applies to loads and stores from/to secret-dependent addresses.
Furthermore, we generalize the method from [27] to tolerate a certain number
of incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on normal exhaustive search.
Now we discuss possible countermeasures against our attack. We consider
evaluating or improving our attack to work against these countermeasures as
future work. First of all, note that any countermeasure based on modifying the
base point before or during the scalar multiplication does not protect against
our attacks, since they aim at exploiting address-dependent and the cswap leak-
age. Similarly, scalar blinding or splitting does not affect the attack, since we
require only one trace and could hence recover the blinded or split scalar. The
knowledge of the randomized scalar (or the split scalars) is sufficient to either
recover the original scalar or to compute the correct scalar multiplication result.
A potential countermeasure against our attack is presented in [50], perform-
ing online data randomization during the exponentiation to prevent horizontal
collision-correlation attacks. The main idea is to the split scalar to two parts
and to randomly interleave two scalar multiplications. However, we believe that
our attack might still be mounted if four templates are used recognize which bit
is processed and during which ECSM.
The idea behind a another memory-address countermeasure [35] is to store
sensitive variables at a memory address with the same Hamming weight for the
two different addresses. We believe that although this would cause our attack
to be less effective, the addresses leakage may still be identified by template
matching. Randomization of memory addresses of the coordinates used in the
Montgomery ladder before the ECSM might lead to our attack being less ef-
fective, since the templates are prepared assuming fixed addresses. The above
countermeasure can be improved by randomizing not only the addresses but also
the memory accesses [37,39,38].
The countermeasure of [31] protects against localized EM template attacks
on the ECC Montgomery ladder. The main idea is to randomly swap the ladder
registers at the end of a ladder iteration; the addressing of the registers within
the loop is inverted according to whether the registers have been swapped. The
countermeasure is uniform in its operation sequence, and hence, our template at-
tacks would be infeasible in principle. In addition, several randomized techniques
protecting the Montgomery ladder are presented in [22]. Similarly to the counter-
measure of [31], these techniques generate operation sequences independent from
the scalar. Thus we assume that our attack would be less effective or ineffective
against these countermeasures. We therefore regard as future work evaluating
and improving our attacks with respect to the three latter countermeasures.
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A Target Details
The microcontroller was clocked at fdev = 7.3728MHz in our setup, i.e., the
duration of one cycle is 135.63 ns. We placed a 49.9Ohm resistor into the ground
path of the microcontroller to measure the current consumption of the device
using the Picoscope 5203 at a sample rate fsample = 500MHz. Note that due to
limitations on the size of the scope’s memory, it is not possible to capture a single
trace of a full scalar multiplication, which has a duration of approximately 2 s.
Hence, we chose to capture only the interesting parts of each ECSM iteration, by
using the segmented memory feature of the oscilloscope, partitioning the memory
into small segments and triggering at each ECSM iteration. Note that in a real
application, the adversary would likely not have a trigger signal for each ECSM
iteration, but could easily overcome this problem with a pattern-based trigger
generator or using an oscilloscope with larger memory.
B Trace Pre-processing
Since the sample rate fsample is not a multiple of the device clock frequency
fdev, we first re-sampled the recorded traces to fresample = 493.978MHz (i.e.,
one cycle is composed of 67 sample points) to facilitate subsequent processing
steps, in particular the cutting into single clock cycles, cf. Section Appendix B.
For re-sampling, we used libsamplerate9.
Filtering We digitally bandpass-filtered the traces using a Butterworth filter
with a lower cutoff frequency fl = 300 kHz and an upper cutoff frequency of
fu = 2 · fdev = 14.75MHz. These frequencies were determined experimentally,
by testing various choices and selecting the parameters that yield the highest
success rate (cf. Section 4.3 and Section 5.5).
Alignment and cutting To align the recorded traces, we employed a standard
pattern-based approach: we selected a part of the first trace as the reference, and
computed the euclidean distance or correlation for each offset within a chosen
range for each following trace. We then shifted each trace by the respective offset
that minimized the distance measure.
Finally, the filtered and aligned traces were cut into parts based on a cycle-
accurate execution trace of the test implementation generated using an AVR
simulator. This enabled us to generate templates for a specific instruction or an
instruction sequence with cycle accuracy.
C Attack Parameters Investigation
To investigate the effect of various pre-processing steps and attack parameters,
Table 3 gives the average success rate and confidence level for a range of choices.
We selected the parameter and method combination that yields the highest
overall confidence level to produce Figure 2.
9 http://www.mega-nerd.com/SRC/
Table 3: Results from the Load attack with templates generated from a set of 10 traces
and tested on a set of 10 traces from a different capture session. Only the first 15 ECSM
iterations were targeted. Success Rate and Confidence Level values are averaged.
Class Method / Param. Name Param. Value SR (%) CL (%)
No filtering - 57.3 -
Upper cutoff freq. 2.5 * fdev 92.9 -
" 2.3 *fdev 93.6 -
Filtering " 2.1 * fdev 93.6 -
" 2.0 * fdev 94.3 -
" 1.7 * fdev 92.9 -
" 1.5 * fdev 90.7 -
" 1.3 * fdev 90.0 -
Upper cutoff freq. fsample/1.9 94.3 -
(pLow, pHigh); nPOI (12.5, 87.5); 23 58.5 32.4
" (25, 75); 71 76.4 33.9
" (35, 65); 324 94.3 36.8
" (37.5, 62.5); 686 69.8 33.4
POI Selection (pLow, pHigh); nPOI (40, 60); 1500 64.1 31.6
Force ≥ 1 sp per instr. (35, 65); 669 92.1 68.6
Force ≥ 1 sp per instr. (40, 60); 1724 90.0 71.1
Limit 1 sp per instr. (35, 65); 134 85.7 8.6
Limit 1 sp per instr. (40, 60); 723 78.6 28.6
Classification Sum of distances + POI (35, 65); 324 94.3 33.9
Majority voting + POI (35, 65); 324 57.0 9.8
Normal sum + POI 1; (35, 65) 94.3 38.6
" 10; (35, 65) 92.8 36.4
Win. compression Normal sum + POI 67; (35, 65) 79.3 20.7
Absolute sum + POI 1; (35, 65) 94.3 23.1
" 10; (35, 65) 92.1 27.6
Absolute sum + POI 67; (35, 65) 77.1 18.3
Multiple of stdev 2.0 92.1 40.7
Outlier removal " 1.7 90.0 40.7
Multiple of stdev 1.4 88.6 36.4
Distinguisher Euclidean Distance - 92.1 57.1
Pearson Correlation - 93.6 61.4
Combinations EuclDst. + ≥ 1 sp per instr. (35, 65); 669 92.1 79.3
Corr. + ≥ 1 sp per instr. (35, 65); 669 93.6 65.0
